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Two Key Questions
• What do we expect the human to do?
• What is the human doing now?
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3Flightcrew “mind the gap” between 10-9 hazard and 10-5 automation
Sherry, L., Mauro, R. (2014) Design of Cockpit Displays to Explicitly Support Flightcrew Intervention Tasks.
In Proceedings IEEE/AIAA 33rd Digital Avionics Systems Conference (DASC), Colorado Springs, Co. Oct, 2014. 
A thought experiment
• Human error has been implicated in 70% to 
80% of accidents in civil and military aviation 
(Weigmann & Shappell, 2001).
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A thought experiment
• Human error has been implicated in 70% to 
80% of accidents in civil and military aviation 
(Weigmann & Shappell, 2001).
• Pilots intervene to manage aircraft 
malfunctions on 20% of normal flights 
(PARC/CAST, 2013).
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A thought experiment
• Human error has been implicated in 70% to 80% of 
accidents in civil and military aviation (Weigmann & 
Shappell, 2001).
• Pilots intervene to manage aircraft malfunctions on 
20% of normal flights (PARC/CAST, 2013).
• World-wide jet data from 2007-2016 (Boeing, 2016)
– 244 million departures
– 388 accidents
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A thought experiment
• Human error 
implicated in 
80% of 
accidents.
• Pilots manage 
malfunctions 
on 20% of 
normal flights.
• 388 accidents 
over 244M 
departures.
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When we 
characterize 
safety only in 
terms of 
errors and 
failures, we 
ignore the 
vast majority 
of human 
impacts on 
the system.
Holbrook, J. (2018, April). Human performance contributions to safety in commercial aviation [PowerPoint presentation].
NASA Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, CA. 
A Little Problem with our Assumptions
• Human error has been implicated in 70% to 
80% of accidents in civil and military aviation 
(Weigmann & Shappell, 2001).
Wrong! 100% of accidents are due to human 
limitations!
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A Little Problem with our Assumptions
• Human error has been implicated in 70% to 80% of 
accidents in civil and military aviation (Weigmann & 
Shappell, 2001).
Wrong! 100% of accidents are due to human 
limitations!
• Pilots intervene to manage aircraft malfunctions on 
20% of normal flights (PARC/CAST, 2013).
Pilots intervene in various ways on 100% of flights!
• World-wide jet data from 2007-2016 (Boeing, 2016)
– 244 million departures
– 388 accidents
How do you define “accident”?
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Human-Centered?
• It’s the humans who make the system work 
and for humans’ sake.
• The system is centered on the human.
• So we better design the system to be human-
centered to best support the humans in their 
work.
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But how?
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• THE Model, the 4C’s and the 4P’s.
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